In 2010, Fan et al. proposed an efficient anonymous multi-receiver identity-based encryption scheme. This scheme allows a sender to send an encrypted message to a set of designated receivers while preserving receiver anonymity. The scheme is highly efficient for each receiver as it requires only two pairing operations. However, we found that the scheme failed to protect receiver anonymity and the security notation for receiver anonymity captures only semantics in the case of a single receiver, but does not for multiple recipients. In this paper, we present the weaknesses and propose an improved scheme. The improved scheme enhances both security and computational performance.
INTRODUCTION
In a distributed environment, there are many applications that require a sender to efficiently and securely transmit messages to a set of authorized receivers, and only those authorized receivers are allowed to access the content. At times, the set of authorized receivers will change dynamically. Examples of such applications include a conference on VoIP and pay-TV systems. These scenarios require an efficient multi-cast scheme such as those in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] or a multi-receiver encryption scheme such as those in [6] [7] [8] [9] . Interestingly, in several application scenarios of multi-cast encryption or multi-receiver encryption, an authorized receiver does not want other entities, except for the operating center, to have identity information (or personal credential information. One example is for pay-TV systems where one want to protect his personal viewing selection, especially in regard to sensitive programs. This makes it necessary to have identity protection or anonymity protection [9] for personal privacy interest. Another interesting application of anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme is like the recent Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution [10] and its following revolutions (or called Twitter Revolution), where one sender wants to send an encrypted protest proposal to a set of designated persons such that only the designated receiver is able to decrypt and verify the message. For such applications, revealing the identity of each possible receiver would endanger receiver's safety. An interesting property of such applications is that the membership of such group of designated receivers is usually dynamic or even ad hoc.
One can implement the earlier-mentioned schemes with either a symmetric-key setting or an asymmetric-key setting. However, key management in a symmetric-key setting is not scalable since the number of shared keys that one entity needs to maintain increases linearly with the number of potential receivers. In contrast, a scheme with an asymmetric-key setting has better scalability. Currently, asymmetric-key settings based on a certificate are very popular, but such settings require an entity to first verify the to-be-used public key and then verify a signature or encrypted messages using the verified public key. This public key verification and certificate maintenance incurs extra overhead. In 1984, Shamir [11] proposed the first identity-based cryptosystem or ID-based cryptosystem, where an entity's public well-known identity (such as social security number, e-mail address or IP address) is used as a public key, such that there is no need to verify the public key before using it. This approach saves on the overhead in public-key maintenance. Therefore, this paper focuses on multi-receiver identity-based encryption schemes that take into consideration receiver privacy.
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [12] proposed an identity-based encryption scheme using Weil pairing. Subsequent to that, many researchers tried to improve upon the scheme [1, 2, 4-6, 8, 13] . In 2005, Du et al. [1] proposed an efficient ID-based multi-cast scheme, but Chien [2] reported a security weakness in the scheme. Later, Lee et al. [3] and Yang et al. [4] , respectively, proposed their own ID-based broadcasting schemes, but did not consider the issue of members joining and leaving.
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In 2005, Wang and Wu [5] proposed an identity-based multicast encryption scheme, but only the group center is allowed to multi-cast the message and an efficient algorithm was not proposed to handle membership change. In a multi-receiver encryption scheme, a sender randomly chooses each time a set of authorized receivers. Baek et al. [6] proposed a multi-receiver ID-based key encryption scheme and proved the security in the selective-ID model using the random oracle technology. Lu and Hu [7] also proposed a multi-receiver public-key encryption scheme using pairing. Chatterjee and Sarkar [8] proposed the first multi-receiver ID-based encryption scheme with sub-linear cipher-text sizes. None of these schemes, however, consider the issue of receiver anonymity.
To protect signer anonymity, Lal and Kushwah [14] proposed an anonymous ID-based signcryption scheme for multireceivers in the random oracle model, and Zhang and Xu [15] proposed an ID-based signcryption scheme for multiple receivers in the standard model. To protect receiver's anonymity, Wang et al. [16] and Xu [17] , respectively, proposed ID-based encryption schemes for multi-receivers. However, in both [16] and [17] , each group member needs to maintain two sets of public-key and private-key pairs, and one of the key-pair sets changes as group membership changes. These approaches, however, are inefficient.
Fan et al. [9] recently proposed an anonymous multireceiver encryption scheme that is more efficient than its counterparts and claimed to protect receiver's anonymity. We found, however, that Fan et al.'s scheme failed to protect receiver anonymity. The security weaknesses include: (i) an authorized receiver can easily verify whether a specific user is also one of the authorized receivers using only two pairing computations; (ii) a non-authorized entity can tell which entity is an authorized receiver using only O(n 2 ) computations, where n is the number of designated receivers; and (iii) the definition of anonymity in Fan et al.'s work only captures and protects the anonymity for a case where there is only one receiver and fails to consider most cases that have more than one receiver. This paper discusses the weaknesses of Fan et al.'s schemes and then proposes a new scheme. The proposed scheme improves security and computational performance. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Fan et al.'s scheme and then reports on weaknesses in the scheme. Section 3 proposes our new scheme. Section 4 analyzes its security and evaluates performance. Finally, Section 5 states our conclusions.
SECURITY WEAKNESSES IN FAN ET AL.'S SCHEME

Review of Fan et al.'s scheme
The scheme is based on pairing in elliptic curve systems. Let G 1 be an additive group and G 2 be a multiplicative group where both groups are cyclic with a prime order q. Let P be a randomly chosen generator for G 1 and e be a bilinear mapping such that e : 
The symmetric encryption and decryption using a key k are denoted as E k () and D k (), respectively. (iv) Publish the system parameters params ≡ {q, G 1 , G 2, e, n, P , P 1 , P pub Extract: Input the system parameters and an entity identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} * for i ∈ [1, n], the system returns the entity's private key
Encrypt: When a sender wants to securely send a message M to a set of selected receivers (ID 1 , . . . , ID i , . . . , ID t ) with 1 ≤ t ≤ n and each identity is chosen from (ID 1 , . . . , ID i , . . . , ID n ), he performs the following tasks.
, and broadcast C.
Decrypt: Input the cipher-text C, params and one private key d i , an authorized receiver with identity ID i decrypts the cipher-text as follows.
(iv) Compute r = H 3 (σ , M ) and test whether U 1 ? = r P or not. If so, the receiver accepts the plaintext M; otherwise, he rejects the cipher-text.
Weaknesses in protecting receiver anonymity
Although one of the main goals of Fan et al.'s scheme is to protect a receiver's anonymity, we find that the scheme fails to protect the anonymity. (i) Any authorized receiver can easily verify whether another entity is also an authorized receiver using only two pairing operations; (ii) Anyone can find all receivers using 2 · n 2 pairing operations, provided that there
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Improved Anonymous Multi-receiver Identity-Based Encryption 441 are t ≥ 2 authorized receivers in that instance; (iii) Fan et al.'s security definition of anonymity only captures the case of a single receiver; therefore, their proof cannot ensure the security of more than one receiver. In the following we assume that there are t ≥ 2 authorized receivers in that instance.
(1) Any receiver can easily verify whether another entity is also an authorized receiver using only two pairing operations.
We assume ID i is one of the t ≥ 2 receivers. Then ID i can perform the following steps to verify whether another entity ID j is also an authorized receiver.
This λ j equals yQ j if ID j is an authorized receiver. But λ j will be a random value ∈ G 1 and will equal yQ j with only negligible probability if ID j is not an authorized receiver. (iii) Check whether the equation e(λ i , Q j ) ? = e(Q i , λ j ) holds, where e(λ i , Q j ) = e(Q i , Q j ) y and e(Q i , λ j ) will equal e(Q i , Q j ) y when ID j is an authorized receiver. Therefore, if ID j is an authorized receiver, then the equation e(λ i , Q j )
It takes two pairing operations to verify whether ID j is an authorized receiver.
(2) Anyone can identify all receivers using O(n 2 ) pairing operations.
Anyone can perform the following steps to identify all the authorized receivers. = e(Q j , λ k ) holds. Obviously, if both ID j and ID k are authorized receivers, then the equation should hold because λ j = yQ j , λ k = yQ k and e(λ j , Q k ) = e(Q j , λ k ) = e(Q j , Q k ) y ; but if either one of them is not an authorized receiver, then the equation will hold with only negligible probability because either λ j or λ k is a random value.
The above check takes 2 · n 2 pairing operations.
(3) The receiver anonymity definition of [9] cannot capture the security semantic of the cases of more than one receiver
To capture the security of anonymity, Fan et al. defined the following security notation for anonymity.
Definition ANON-sID-CPA. Let A be a polynomial-time attacker, and be a general multi-receiver ID-based encryption scheme. A interacts with a Challenger in the following game:
SETUP: The Challenger runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the attacker A the resulting public parameters params, but keeps the master key s secret.
PHASE 1:
A outputs a target identity pair (ID 1 , ID 2 ). Upon receiving (ID 1 , ID 2 ), the Challenger randomly chooses β ∈ {1, 2}.
PHASE 2:
A issues private key extraction queries. Upon receiving the query on ID j , the Challenger returns d j = Extract(params, s, ID j ) under the constraint that ID j = ID 1 and ID j = ID 2 .
CHALLENGE:
A outputs a target plaintext M. The Challenger returns a target cipher-text C = Encrypt(params, ID β , M) to A.
PHASE 3:
A issues private key extraction queries as in PHASE 2.
GUESS:
A finally outputs its guess β ∈ {1, 2} and wins the game if β = β.
The weakness of the earlier-mentioned definition
From C = Encrypt(params, ID β , M) in the earlier-mentioned security definition, we can see that the sender only chooses one receiver in the encryption. This definition cannot capture the semantic of a multi-receiver setting. Fan et al. also defined anonymity security ANON-sID-CCA by extending the above game to adaptive chosen cipher-text attacks. However, the same definition flaw exists in the ANON-sID-CCA notation.
AN IMPROVED SCHEME WITH ENHANCED SECURITY AND COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE
In this section, we propose a new scheme to enhance security and computational performance. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the Co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (Co-BDH) Problem [18, 19] . The new scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 , and the process is described in the following.
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Definition 1 (Co-BDH Problem). Given P , aP , bP , Q for some a, b ∈ R Z * q and Q ∈ R G 1 , compute e(P , Q) ab . Our scheme also consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt. Setup: The system initializes the global parameters as follows.
(i) Pick up an integer s ∈ R Z * q and Set P pub = sP . (ii) Choose five cryptographic hash functions H :
The symmetric encryption and decryption using a key k are denoted as E k () and D k (), respectively. (iii) Publish the system parameters params ≡ {q, G 1 , G 2, e, n, P , P pub , H, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } and keep the master key s secret.
Extract: Input the system parameters and an entity identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} * for i ∈ [1, n], the system returns the entity's private key d i = sQ i , where Q i = H 1 (ID i ). Encrypt: When a sender wants to securely send a message M to a set of selected receivers (ID 1 , . . . , ID i , . . . , ID t ) with 1 ≤ t ≤ n and each identity is chosen from (ID 1 , . . . , ID i , . . . , ID n ), the sender performs the following tasks.
(i) Pick an integer r ∈ R Z * q and a random string σ ∈ R {0, 1} w , and set M) ), and broadcast C.
Decrypt: Input the cipher-text C, params and one private key d i , an authorized receiver with identity ID i decrypts the cipher-text as follows. = H (σ j )P . If there is a σ k satisfying the equation for some k for 1 ≤ k ≤ t, then go to the next step; otherwise, ID i is not an authorized receiver. M ) ). If so, the receiver accepts the message M ; otherwise, he rejects the cipher-text.
The rational of the proposed scheme is as follows. The privacy of the encryption key σ for each broadcast is based on the Co-BDH Problem instance (U 1 = rP , P pub = sP , Q i ); therefore, only the authorized receiver ID i is able to derive the secret key σ . The anonymity of each receiver is ensured because H 2 (e(P , Q i ) rs ) is the only value correlating to each authorized receiver and the value e(P , Q i ) rs is random that any entity (except the sender and the receiver himself) cannot tell it from a random value.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the correctness and security of the proposed scheme.
(1) Correctness
If ID i is an authorized receiver, then this receiver can compute e(U 1 , d i ) = e(rP , sQ i ) = e(P , Q i ) rs = e(P pub , Q i ) r , can derive the right σ from one of (R 1 , . . . , R t ) and then decrypts the cipher-text. (2) Privacy of the message To decrypt the cipher-text, one should own the secret key H 3 (σ ), which is a random value ∈ R {0, 1} w . The only way to derive σ is to compute H 2 (e(P , Q i ) rs ) for some ID i belonging to the authorized receiver set. Given U 1 = rP , P pub = sP and Q i , one would face the Co-BDH problem to compute e(P , Q i ) rs if he is not an authorized receiver.
(3) Anonymity of receivers
In the cipher-text, the only receiver-related value is From (R 1 , . . . , R t ), a legitimate receiver ID i can derive H 2 (e(P pub , Q i ) r ) = H 2 (e(P , Q j ) rs ) of another legitimate receiver ID j . But the value H 2 (e(P , Q j ) rs ) is a random value on which ID i has no way to verify whether it is a valid value or not and has no way to ensure whether ID j is also an authorized receiver. H 4 (σ, M) ) where R i = σ ⊕ H 2 (e(P pub , Q i ) r ) = σ ⊕ H 2 (e(P , Q i ) rs ), it is easy to see that one should derive the encryption key σ to decrypt the cipher-text and the only way to derive σ is to derive the value e(P pub , Q i ) r (or e(P , Q i ) rs ) first. However, given (U 1 = rP , P pub = sP , Q i = H 1 (I D i )), one should face the Co-BDH Problem to compute e(P pub , Q i ) r (or e(P , Q i ) rs ). Since the Co-BDH is hard, the confidentiality of the proposed scheme is secure.
Theorem 2. The receiver anonymity of the proposed scheme is secure if the Co-BDH problem is hard.
Proof. To prove the receiver anonymity protection, we should differentiate an adversary who is a legitimate receiver and an adversary who is not a legitimate receiver.
For an adversary U who is not a legitimate receiver, the only receiver-identity-related values in a cipher-text C ≡ For an adversary ID i who is a legitimate receiver, he is more powerful than a non-legitimate entity since he can compute the secret key σ and H 2 (e(P , Q j ) rs ) from R i = σ ⊕ H 2 (e(P , Q j ) rs ) for any legitimate ID j . However, the value H 2 (e(P , Q j ) rs ) is random that ID i cannot tell it from a random value.
This proves the anonymity protection of the proposed scheme.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the performance of our scheme with Fan et al.'s scheme in terms of computation and communication. To assess communication performance, we consider ciphertext message length, and define the following notation. Let L Q denote the length of one elliptic curve point, L H denotes that of one hash value and L Enc denotes that of one symmetric encryption of the message. Then the cipher-texts of both Fan et al.'s scheme and our scheme consume (t +2)L Q +L H +L Enc , where t denotes the number of the designated receivers. The two schemes share the same communication performance.
To evaluate the computation, we define the following notations. Let C H denote the computation cost of one hashing operation, C M for one modular multiplication, C E for one modular exponentiation, C P for one pairing operation, C Enc for one symmetric encryption of one message or one decryption of an encrypted message, C SM for one scalar point multiplication of elliptic curves and t denotes the number of receivers. The setup phases of the two schemes are the same and they are executed only once-they share the same performance. The extract phase is executed only once for each entity in the two schemes, but our scheme demands one less point addition than Fan et al.'s scheme for each extract operation.
The multi-receiver encryption generation in Fan et al.'s scheme demands (2t + 3)C H + (2t 2 − t + 1)C M + (t 2 − t + 1)C E + C P + C Enc + (t + 2)C SM computations, and the cipher-text decryption in Fan et al.'s scheme demands 3C H +(t −1)C M +C E +2C P +C Enc +tC SM . The multi-receiver encryption preparation in our scheme demands tC H + tC E + t C P + C Enc + 1C SM . To test whether one is an authorized receiver in our scheme, each potential receiver should derive σ j = R j ⊕ H 2 (e (U 1 , d j ) ) and test whether U 2 ? = H (σ j ) holds, and each receiver, on average, tries t/2 such operations to find a match. Therefore, each receiver takes t/2C P + (t + 1)C H + C Enc computations on average. Performance comparisons are summarized in Table 1 . From Table 1 , we can see that our scheme outperforms Fan et al.'s scheme in terms of security, the two schemes share the same communication performance, but it is difficult to compare the computational performance of the two schemes without substituting the notation with practical values. To further quantitatively assess the two schemes' computational performance, we first simplify the cost formulas and then evaluate the formulas using timing results from well-known implementations [20, 21] in the following.
In Table 1 , the most dominating operations are C M , C E , C P and C SM , and the C Enc s in the two schemes are the same. Therefore, we can simplify the encryption preparation cost of Fan et al.'s scheme as (2t 2 − t + 1)C M + (t 2 − t + 1)C E + C P + (t + 2)C SM and simplify the encryption preparation cost of our scheme as tC E +tC P +1C SM . The cipher-text decryption cost of Fan et al.'s scheme is simplified as (t −1)C M +C E +2C P +tC SM , and the cost of our decryption is simplified as t/2C P .
Basically, the computational complexity of a pairing computation is linear with the length of the order of the underlying groups in terms of the number of multiplications in the underlying fields, where the complexity of multiplication is linear with the bit length of the underling field and the extension degree. Further, the computational complexity of scalar point multiplication Q = kP in elliptic curves is roughly equal to |q| * the cost of point doubling +w(k) * the cost of point addition, where q is the order of the curves, |q| is the bit length of the order and w(k) is the weight of k.
In the following, we compare the two schemes using the timing results from Stobauer's implementation, an implementation of an arithmetic of a supersingular curve with group order 160 bits and an extension field of 1028 bits, on a Pentium M 1400 MHz processor and 512 MB RAM using Windows XP and JDK 1.4.1 [21, page 52] . The multiplication and the exponentiation in the extended field, respectively, take 0.163 and 195.08 ms, the point addition and the point doubling, respectively, take 0.661 and 0.59 ms, the scalar point multiplication takes 454.89 ms and the Tate pairing takes 624 ms. Based on these timing results, we estimate the computational cost of the two schemes in Table 2 . In the first row, we list the number of authorized receivers, the second row lists the estimated timing cost of Figure 3 depicts the timing cost of the decryptions of the two schemes. From the figure, we can see that the costs of decryptions of the two schemes are linear with the number of receivers, but Fan et al.'s scheme grows faster than ours. This occurs because Fan et al.'s decryption is linear with (t − 1)C M + tC SM while ours is linear with t/2C P . We can see that our scheme out-performs Fan et al.'s scheme, especially as the number of receivers increases. Considering the two potential applications, we described-PayTV and twitter revolution, and the number of potential receivers depends on each application scenario. The number of potential receivers for each pay-TV broadcasting ranges from only 3-5 receivers up to maybe several thousand receivers (or even more), depending on the popularity of the broadcast program. The number of receivers in one twitter revolution broadcasting would be smaller, and is usually limited by one person's social relation. For most of the applications, the number of receivers would be larger than five, Timing cost in ms number of receivers 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that although Fan et al.'s scheme aimed to protect receiver anonymity, it failed to fully meet this aim, and the security notation for anonymity captures only the semantic of a single-receiver case. In Fan et al.'s scheme, an authorized receiver can easily verify whether a specific user is also one of the authorized receivers using two pairing operations, and a non-authorized entity can identify all the receivers using only O(n 2 ) pairings. To improve the scheme, we have proposed a new scheme that improves receiver anonymity protection and also out-performs Fan et al.'s scheme in terms of computational performance.
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